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Abstract Whether a transitive stative predicate licenses an existential interpretation
of its subject (EIS) depends on the type of object it has. While previous theories
have related this to the object’s ability to function as a topic, I present evidence
that the quantized/homogeneous distinction between objects better captures EIS and
propose an event composition analysis of EIS for transitive stative predicates. This
analysis points to the aspectual nature of EIS and also illuminates other aspectual
behaviors of stage-level/individual-level states.
Keywords: Aktionsart; existential interpretation; lifetime effects; stage-level/individual-
level predicates; states; temporal modification
1 Existential interpretation
One property distinguishing between stage-level and individual-level predicates is
the availability of existential interpretations of subjects (EIS) which affects, among
other things, the interpretation of bare plurals (Carlson 1977; Kratzer 1988/1995).1
For stative predicates, stage-level states like (1a) license EIS, while individual-level
states like (1b) do not license EIS.2
(1) a. Firemen are available. (EIS)
b. Firemen are altruistic. (*EIS)
∗ I would like to thank Marcin Morzycki, Alan Munn, Cristina Schmitt, and Alan Beretta for their
suggestions and comments on earlier drafts of this work. Also, my discussions with Polly Jacobson
and Emma Cunningham were instrumental in developing the analysis presented here.
1 Intuitions concerning the interpretation of bare plurals are often not clear cut. However, a bare plural
can often be replaced by a singular indefinite which, ignoring the kind reading, displays a contrast in
acceptability, as given in (i).
(i) a. A fireman is available.
b. *A fireman is altruistic.
2 My primary concern here is the availability of EIS. As such, I will ignore the equally interesting issue
of the availability of a generic interpretation of bare plural subjects in these sentences. Judgments
will only be given concerning EIS with a * indicating that EIS is judged to be unavailable.
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Understanding the properties underlying the licensing of EIS is the goal of this
paper. While these properties are not directly evident for adjectival predicates, verbal
predicates provide more transparent cases. For instance, the type of object affects
EIS in transitive stative predicates (Fernald 1994, 2000).3 Demonstrative objects
license an EIS as in (2), while bare plural objects do not license an EIS as in (3). I
will refer to this phenomenon as Object Effects.
(2) a. Monkeys live in these trees. (EIS)
b. Tycoons own this bank. (EIS)
(3) a. Monkeys live in trees. (*EIS)
b. Tycoons own banks. (*EIS)
Recent accounts of Object Effects have focused on information structure con-
straints. In particular, topic requirement theories have argued that Object Effects
occur because a non-subject argument acts as the topic of the sentence, licensing
EIS (Heycock 1994; Jäger 2001; Lee 1996). More recently, Kratzer & Selkirk
(2007) proposed that the requirement of a syntactically represented topic accounted
for Object Effects. For instance, in (4a), the topic is a scrambled discourse-given
object dieses Haus ‘this house’, so the subject Maffiosi ‘mafia members’ may remain
low and be non-topicial, (4b). However, in (5a), the topic can only be the subject
Maffiosi ‘mafia members’, so the subject Maffiosi ‘mafia members’ must raise to
topic position, becoming the topic, (5b).4 Also, attempting to scramble the bare















‘I know that mafia members own this house.’
(EIS)













‘I know that mafia members own houses.’
(*EIS)













3 While not directly relevant here, I take this as initial evidence for the configurational nature of
stage-level/individual-level predicates, à la Verkuyl (1972).
4 Kratzer & Selkirk (2007) also observe that an accent on the predicate is related to EIS. In (4a), the
predicate can be deaccented, but in (5a), the predicate must receive a pitch accent.
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Topic requirement theories like this predict that EIS is linked to the ability of
the object to function as a topic. To be a topic, the object must be strong since
weak objects cannot be topics (Jäger 2001). Therefore, topic requirement theories
predict that the weak/strong distinction governs the availability of EIS: demonstrative
objects are strong and EIS is licensed; bare plural objects are weak and EIS is not
licensed.
Interestingly, the alternation of EIS in stative predicates bares a striking resem-
blance to the alternation of telicity in eventive predicates. Demonstrative objects
yield telic interpretations as in (7), while bare plural objects yield atelic interpreta-
tions as in (8).
(7) a. John built this house in six months.
b. The students solved these problems in an hour.
(8) a. John built houses #in six months.
b. The students solved problems #in an hour.
Discussing similar observations, Verkuyl (1972) proposed an event composition
theory in which a specified quantity object yields a telic interpretation and an
unspecified quantity object yields an atelic interpretation. Since then, research has
attempted to characterize both the types of objects which affect telicity and the way
objects enter into the composition of the VP. Concerning the types of objects, a rich
literature has argued that quantity plays an important distinction: quantized objects
yield telic interpretations and homogeneous objects yield atelic interpretations (Borer
2005a,b; Kiparsky 1998; Krifka 1989, 1992, 1998).5
In a recent proposal on the composition of telicity, Kratzer (2004) derives telic
and atelic eventive VPs through the meaning of the accusative case. Accusative
case enters into the composition of the VP as shown in (9) and, following Krifka
5 I am assuming Borer’s (2005a; 2005b) definitions to distinguish between quantized and homogeneous
objects, given in (i).
(i) a. Quantity: P is quantity iff P is not homogeneous.
b. Homogeneous: P is homogeneous iff P is cumulative and divisive.
i. P is cumulative iff ∀x,y[P(x) & P(y)→ P(x∪ y)]
P is cumulative iff for all x and y with property P, the union of x and y also has
property P.
ii. P is divisive iff ∀x[P(x)→∃y[P(y) & y< x] & ∀x,y[P(x) & P(y) & y< x→ P(x−
y)]]
P is divisive iff for all x with property P there is a proper part y of x which also has
property P, and for all x and y with property P if y is a proper part of x then the
subtraction of y from x also has property P.
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(1998), enforces a mapping to events through the denotation given in (10).6,7 The
mapping to events derives a quantized (i.e. telic) event when the object is quantized






(10) JACCK= λR〈e,〈s,t〉〉λxλe[R(x)(e) & ∀x′[x′ ≤ x→∃e′[e′ ≤ e & R(x′)(e′)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mapping to Events
]
Event composition theories propose that telicity is linked to the quantity of the
object. If the resemblance between EIS and telicity is more than a coincidence, event
composition theories would predict that the quantity of the object governs Object
Effects as well: demonstrative objects are quantized and license EIS; bare plural
objects are homogeneous and do not license EIS.
Therefore, topic requirement theories and event composition theories make
different predictions about which types of objects license EIS. However, the literature
on Object Effects has not examined data which would distinguish between these two
positions. Bare plural objects are both weak and homogeneous, and demonstrative
objects are both strong and quantized. Thus, a wider range of data is needed to
distinguish which properties license EIS.
6 Semantic types: individuals, e; eventualities, s; and propositions, t. Variables: over individuals, x and
y; over eventualities, e for events and s for states. Compositional operations: Function Application
and Predicate Abstraction.
7 For clarity of exposition, I suppress Kratzer’s measure f in this paper. For Kratzer, measure f
indicates “the assumption that there is some general cognitive mechanism that determines a range of
functions that map the referents of certain direct objects into concrete or abstract ‘measuring rods’
that are associated with those referents in some way or other” (394). Certainly some mileage could
be gained by considering which “measuring rods” are applicable in stative predicates, but as this is
not the main focus here, I set it aside for future consideration.
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2 Objects effects revisited
Topic requirement theories predict that EIS depends on the weak/strong distinction
between objects. Event composition theories predict that EIS depends on the quan-
tized/homogeneous distinction between objects. Therefore, both theories predict that
mass noun and bare plural objects will not license EIS and that strong determiners
and strong quantifiers will license EIS. The theories differ, however, on the behavior
of bare numeral, weak determiner, and weak quantifier objects. Topic requirement
theories predict that these object types will not license EIS because they are all weak.
Event composition theories predict that these object types will license EIS because
they are all quantized. A summary of these predictions is given in the table below
and tested in (11–20).
Mass Noun or Bare Numeral, Weak Strong Determiner
Bare Plural Determiner, or Quantifier or Quantifier
weak/strong *EIS *EIS EIS
quantity *EIS EIS EIS
Mass noun objects do not license EIS.
(11) a. Monkeys live on land. (*EIS)
b. Tycoons own silverware. (*EIS)
Bare plural objects do not license EIS.
(12) a. Monkeys live in trees. (*EIS)
b. Tycoons own banks. (*EIS)
Bare numerals can license EIS, though only marginally.8
(13) a. Monkeys live in three trees. (?EIS)
b. Tycoons own two banks. (?EIS)
Singular indefinites can license EIS, also marginally.9
8 Contexts like those in (i) bring out EIS in these marginal examples. See Fernald 2000, Glasbey 1997,
and Husband 2010 for some discussion on the role of context in licensing EIS.
(i) a. Monkey Context: “Behind my house is mangrove forest.”
b. Tycoon Context: “In this city there are over 50 privately owned banks.”
9 When these sentences are presented in a list, their acceptability improves (Schmitt 1996).
(i) a. Monkeys live in a tree, bats live in a cave, and weasels live in a burrow.
b. Tycoons own a bank, lawyers own a firm, and hippies own a coffee shop.
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(14) a. Monkeys live in a tree. (??EIS)
b. Tycoons own a bank. (??EIS)
Weak quantifiers can license EIS.
(15) a. Monkeys live in several trees. (EIS)
b. Tycoons own several banks. (EIS)
(16) a. Monkeys live in many trees. (EIS)
b. Tycoons own many banks. (EIS)
Definites can license EIS.
(17) a. Monkeys live in the trees. (EIS)
b. Tycoons own the bank. (EIS)
Demonstratives can license EIS.
(18) a. Monkeys live in these trees. (EIS)
b. Tycoons own this bank. (EIS)
Strong quantifiers can license EIS.
(19) a. Monkeys live in every tree. (EIS)
b. Tycoons own every bank. (EIS)
(20) a. Monkeys live in each tree. (EIS)
b. Tycoons own each bank. (EIS)
Summarizing the data above, mass noun and bare plural objects do not license
EIS (11–12). All other object types license EIS. Bare numeral and weak determiner
objects are generally less acceptable, though EIS is possible (13–14). Weak quan-
tifier, strong determiner, and strong quantifier objects license EIS (15–20). This
pattern of data supports event composition theories over topic requirement theories.
In particular, the evidence that weak quantifier objects license EIS is strong evidence
against topic requirement theories. EIS, then, appears to be a matter of aspect.
3 The aspectual nature of EIS
At their heart, event composition theories are theories about the part-structures of
individuals and eventualities. While the relationship between part-structure and
telicity is now well understood, the relationship between part-structure and EIS
does not seem so straightforward. Since EIS is about individuals, we need a way to
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talk about the part-structure of individuals. Carlson (1977) provides us with such a
system using two different sorts in the domain of individuals: a stage of an individual,
“roughly, a spatially and temporally bounded manifestation of something”; and an
individual, “that whatever-it-is that ties a series of stages together to make them
stages of the same thing” (115). In this system, stage-level states are about some
stage of an individual, and individual-level states are, in a sense, about all the stages
of an individual.
What, then, does this tell us about the representation of stative predicates and
their Aktionsart? Consider the role of quantity in determining the behavior of a
transitive stative predicate. Transitive stative predicates which license EIS are those
which have quantized objects. They are also those which are about a stage of an
individual. Suppose that what a stage of an individual is is a quantized representation
of that individual. Stage-level states, then, would be about a quantized stage of an
individual. On the other hand, transitive stative predicates which do not license EIS
are those which have homogeneous objects. They are also those which are about all
the stages of an individual, i.e. the individual itself. Suppose that what an individual
itself is is a homogeneous representation of the individual. Individual-level states,
then, would be about homogeneous stages of an individual.10,11
What is aspectual about stative predicates, then, is how they relate to the stages
of their subjects. Stage-level states predicate over a quantized stage of an individual,
while individual-level states predicate over homogeneous stages of an individual.
EIS is aspectual because it reflects the internal temporal structure of individuals.
Since a quantized stage of an individual is a spatiotemporally bounded manifestation
of an individual, its existence is inferred. Homogeneous stages of an individual,
however, are not spatiotemporally bounded, and existence is not guaranteed.12
4 Quantity in stative predicates
4.1 The composition of stative VPs
Since both stative and eventive predicates are sensitive to the same types of objects,
I propose that VP-internal composition of states and events is the same, following
Kratzer’s (2004) event(uality) composition. Through the mapping to events encoded
in the semantics of case, the eventuality argument receives the part-structure of its
10 This approach is somewhat akin to suggestions from Chierchia (1998) about using parts of individuals
across worlds to understand genericity.
11 Under the theory being developed here, predicates only select for stages of individuals as the sortal
type of their arguments, constraining the sortal types predicates select for. Individuals themselves are
only indirectly accessed through a homogeneous predicate.




object. Examples of a quantized stative VP and a homogeneous stative VP are given
in (21) and (22) respectively.
(21) Jown this bankK=
λ s[own(this-bank)(s) & ∀x′[x′ ≤ this-bank→∃s′[s′ ≤ s & own(x′)(s′)]]]
(22) Jown banksK=
λ s[own(banks)(s) & ∀x′[x′ ≤ banks→∃s′[s′ ≤ s & own(x′)(s′)]]]
For a quantized state, the mapping to events derives a quantized state because its
object is quantized. For (21), the demonstrative object this bank is quantized and
thus there is no proper part which is also this bank. The meaning of accusative case
maps the quantized part structure of this bank to the part structure of the state s by
stating the existence of substates s′ which are ownings of the proper parts of this
bank. Since this bank has only one part, namely itself, the only substate s′ asserted
is the one identical with the state s.
For a homogeneous state, the mapping to events derives a homogeneous state
because its object is homogeneous. For (22), the bare plural object banks is homo-
geneous and thus has proper parts which are also banks. The meaning of accusative
case maps the homogeneous part structure of banks to the part structure of the state
s by stating the existence of substates s′ which are ownings of the proper parts of
banks. Since banks has unbounded numbers of proper parts which are also banks, an
unbounded number of substates s′ is asserted.
4.2 Introducing the subject
Following Kratzer (1996), I assume that the external argument is introduced by a
functional head, Voice. The denotations of Voice heads are composed with meaning
of a predicate by the compositional rule of Event Identification, given in (23), which
adds conditions to the eventuality, as in (24). Kratzer also proposes that Event
Identification is constrained by Aktionsart: the predicates it is combining together
must be of the same Aktionsart type, constraining the relationship between θ roles
and eventive and stative predicates.
(23) Event Identification:
f〈e,〈s,t〉〉 g〈s,t〉 → h〈e,〈s,t〉〉
λxλe[ f (x)(e)] λe[g(e)] → λxλe[ f (x)(e) & g(e)]
(24) VoiceP〈s,t〉




As discusses above, EIS is related to the quantity of the predicate. To capture this
relationship, I propose extending Kratzer’s stative Voice head to include a mapping
to objects, given in (25).13 The stative Voice head performs two roles. First, as in
Kratzer 1996, it relates the external argument to the eventuality via its θ role, holder.
Second, it maps the part-structure of the eventuality to the subject’s part-structure,
asserting that for every substate, there is a part of the subject which is the holder of
that substate.
(25) JVoiceSK= λxλ s[Holder(x)(s) & ∀s′[s′ ≤ s→∃x′[x′ ≤ x & Holder(x′)(s′)]]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Mapping to Objects
]
Examples following from (21) and (22) are given in (26) and (27), respectively.
In both cases, the stative voice head introduces the subject as the holder of the state
and also introduces a mapping to objects. For quantized states like (26), the state
consists of a single state, an owning of this bank, as discussed above. The mapping to
objects asserts the existence of a stage of the subject for each substate, but since there
is only one substate, namely, the state itself, only one stage of the subject is asserted
as the holder of that state. Since this is a quantized stage, it is spatiotemporally
bounded and EIS is licensed. For homogeneous states like (27), the state consists of
a homogeneous part structure of substates, each an owning of banks, as discussed
above. The mapping to objects asserts the existence of a stage, i.e. a part, of the
subject for each of these substates such that that stage of the subject is the holder of
that substate. Since this is a homogeneous set of stages, no spatiotemporal bound is
given and EIS is not licensed.
(26) JTycoons own this bankK= λ s[Holder(Tycoons)(s) & ∀s′[s′ ≤ s→∃x′[x′ ≤
Tycoons & Holder(x′)(s′)]] & [own(this-bank)(s) & ∀x′[x′ ≤ this-banks →
∃s′[s′ ≤ s & own(x′)(s′)]]]]
(27) JTycoons own banksK = λ s[Holder(Tycoons)(s) & ∀s′[s′ ≤ s → ∃x′[x′ ≤
Tycoons & Holder(x′)(s′)]] & [own(banks)(s) & ∀x′[x′ ≤ banks→ ∃s′[s′ ≤
s & own(x′)(s′)]]]]
13 Examples like those in (i) and (ii) suggest that a similar mapping appears to also be needed in events,
given in (iii). Note that it is a mapping to events as the part-structure of the subject affects the
part-structure of the event.
(i) a. Settlers crossed the desert for years.
b. #The settlers crossed the desert for years.
(ii) a. Water leaked through the roof for an hour.
b. #A gallon of water leaked through the roof for an hour.





4.2.1 Evidence for voice in stative predicates
In addition to introducing the external argument, Kratzer (1996) also proposes that
Voice projects only when accusative case is assigned to the object. Drawing on
work by Abney (1987), Kratzer proposes that nominalizing affixes like -ing attach to
different syntactic levels of the extended verbal projection. Possessive gerunds result
from -ing attaching to the VP. Kratzer argues that accusative case is assigned to the
object and Voice must project in possessive gerunds as in (28). of gerunds result
from -ing attaching to the verb. Kratzer argues that this prevents the assignment of
accusative case to the object and thus also blocks Voice, as given in (29).
(28) [DP Mariai [ ’s [NP -ing [VoiceP ti [ Voice [VP read [DP Pride and Prejudice ] ]
] ] ] ] ]
(29) [DP Maria [ ’s [NP [ -ing read ] [PP of Pride and Prejudice ] ] ] ]
Of particular interest here is the range of interpretations the genitive subject DPs
of these gerunds can express. For possessive gerunds, the genitive DP must express
the agent relation to the event, given in (30). It must be the case that Maria was
the agent of the reading Pride and Prejudice event. However, for of gerunds, the
genitive DP may express “a general notion of relatedness of which the agent relation
is but a special case” (Kratzer 1996: 128) to the event, given in (31). That is, Maria
may have only attended a reading of Pride and Prejudice and we are using that to
identify the event.
(30) We remember Maria’s reading Pride and Prejudice.
a. Maria is the Agent of the reading Pride and Prejudice event.
b. *Maria is only related to the reading Pride and Prejudice event.
(31) We remember Maria’s reading of Pride and Prejudice.
a. Maria is the Agent of the reading Pride and Prejudice event.
b. Maria is only related to the reading Pride and Prejudice event.
If stative predicates also introduce their external argument by means of Voice, we
may expect the same nominalization tests to detect the presence of Voice in states. In
(32) and (33), I present evidence for the presence of Voice in stative predicates. The
possessive gerund in (32) requires Glenn Beck to be the holder of a state of hating
Obama. However, the of gerund in (33), while allowing Glenn Beck to be the holder
of a state of hating Obama, also allows for a general notion of relatedness of Glenn
Beck to a state of hating Obama.14 Indeed, (33) would be true even if Glenn Beck
14 A context for the second possible interpretation of these sentences is given in (i).
(i) We all know that sometimes political pundits fake their personal feelings when speaking to their
base. You know, anything for the rating!
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has no feelings at all towards Obama. However, that would be false given (32).
(32) Glenn Beck’s hating Obama was contagious.
a. Glenn Beck is the Holder of the hating Obama state.
b. *Glenn Beck is only related to the hating Obama state.
(33) Glenn Beck’s hating of Obama was contagious.
a. Glenn Beck is the Holder of the hating Obama state.
b. Glenn Beck is only related to the hating Obama state.
Since nominalization tests can diagnose the presence of Voice in stative predi-
cates, two further predictions arise from the hypothesis that Voice is the locus of the
mapping to objects which affects EIS. First, since accusative case is assigned to their
objects, the quantity of the object should affect EIS in possessive gerunds. Second,
since accusative case is not assigned to their objects, the quantity of the object should
not affect EIS in of gerunds. Also, since of gerunds do not project Voice, they
should be unable to license EIS because they do not introduce the mapping to objects
necessary for EIS. This predicts that of gerunds will not license EIS.
While the judgments of EIS is difficult in these sentences, to the extent they are
clear at all, all of the predictions are born out. The objects of possessive gerunds
affects EIS, given in (34), and, regardless of their objects, of gerunds do not license
EIS, as in (35).15
(34) a. News anchors’ hating these politicians was contagious. (EIS)
b. News anchors’ hating politicians was contagious. (*EIS)
(35) a. News anchors’ hating of these politicians was contagious. (*EIS)
b. News anchors’ hating of politicians was contagious. (*EIS)
5 Other aspectual phenomena
I have analyzed EIS as an aspectual issue reflecting the internal temporal make-up of
individuals, but there are other properties of stage-level/individual-level predicates
which are, perhaps, more naturally consider aspectual. Here I extend the analysis to
two of these: lifetime effects and restrictions on temporal modification.
5.1 Lifetime effects
An individual-level predicate in the past tense often triggers an inference that the
subject is dead, as in (36). This lifetime effect has been discussed in several studies
(Kratzer 1988/1995; Magri 2009; Mittwoch 2007; Musan 1995, 1997; Percus 1997).
15 Many thanks to E.T. Cunningham for her clear judgments on these data.
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(36) Gregory was from America.  Gregory is dead.
Musan (1997), for instance, captures lifetime effects through a conversational
implicature. Predicates in the past tense assert that a situation is over, and since
individual-level predicates hold throughout an individual’s lifetime, the past tense of
an individual-level predicate triggers a conversational implicature: if the subject was
still alive, it would be more informative to use the present tense.
A question to ask, however, is how one knows when a predicate is individual-
level, especially given the Object Effects of transitive stative predicates. This
knowledge cannot be part of the verb’s meaning, and it is not clear how it would arise
from the verb’s arguments. Instead, I have argued that the stage-level/individual-
level behavior of transitive stative predicates is determined compositionally from the
configuration of the verb with its particular arguments.
I propose that lifetime effects arise compositionally from the quantity of predi-
cates. Consider the following examples. Demonstrative objects lead to weak lifetime
effect (if there at all), as in (37a). Since demonstrative objects derive quantized
predicates which apply to a quantized state of the subject, lifetime effects do not
arise because only some stage of the individual is put in the past. However, bare
plural objects lead to a strong lifetime implication, as in (37b). Since bare plural
objects derive homogeneous predicates which apply to homogeneous stages of the
subject, i.e. the individual itself, lifetime effects arise in these cases because all of
the stages of the individual are put in the past. Thus, the quantity of the object not
only affects EIS, but also appears to be linked to the lifetime effects on the subject.
(37) a. John owned this bank. 6 John is dead.
b. John owned banks.  John is dead.
5.2 Restrictions on temporal modification
Individual-level predicates place tight restrictions on temporal modification. Most
temporal modifiers cannot appear with individual-level predicates. (38a) is typical
of individual-level predicates. However, Percus (1997) observed that some temporal
modification is acceptable with certain individual-level predicates. Although the
predicate is still individual-level, given a proper span of time, a temporal modifier
like in his adulthood in (38b) can be acceptable.
(38) a. #John was tall yesterday.
b. John was tall in his adulthood.
Percus argued that examples like (38b) show that individual-level predicates
are not incapable of receiving temporal modification. Instead, he proposes that
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examples like (38a) are blocked because they are “out-of-the-blue” utterances and
are evaluated with respect to our global context, i.e. our world knowledge. World
knowledge tells us that individual-level predicates denote properties of individuals
which tend to be stable from one time point to another (Chierchia 1995).
(39) P is tendentially stable iff ∀s1,s2 ∈ Wd, x, [P(s1)(x) = 1 & s2 follows s1
temporally & P(s2)(x) is defined]→ P(s2)(x) = 1
Concerning stability and the restrictions it places on individual-level predicates,
questions similar to those posed for lifetime effects arise. How do we know if a
transitive stative predicate is stable?
As with lifetime effects, I propose that the quantity of predicates derives their
stability. Take the following examples into consideration. Demonstrative objects
yield stative predicates which are temporally unrestricted, as in (40a). The state
composed from a demonstrative object is quantized and, thus, is not temporally
stable because they have multiple instances which are not open ended and can come
and go. Bare plural objects yield temporally restrictive stative predicates, as in (40b).
The state composed from a bare plural object is homogeneous and, thus, tends to
be stable because their temporal contour is open ended and extends indefinitely.
Only temporal modifiers which encompass these indefinite temporal extensions can
modify homogeneous stative predicates. Thus, the range of temporal modification
for quantized stative predicates is much wider than homogeneous stative predicates.
So, as with lifetime implications, the quantity of the object not only affects EIS, but
also affects the restriction on temporal modification.
(40) a. John owned this bank yesterday.
b. #John owned banks yesterday.
6 Conclusions
Like events, the interpretation of states depends on the type of their objects. While
previous theories linked these Object Effects to topic requirements, a wider in-
vestigation found that quantity affects EIS, suggesting that EIS is related to event
composition. I proposed that states inherit the quantity of their objects, and that
subjects inherit the quantity of their state. Quantized stative predicates apply to a
quantized stage of the subject, licensing EIS. Homogeneous stative predicates apply
to homogeneous stages of the subject, blocking EIS. EIS, then, is a matter of aspect
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